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1 Introduction
One of the dominant trends in the evolution of the
Arab women’s movements is a steady increase in
the number of women’s non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) dealing with aspects of
women’s lives such as health, education, legal
literacy, income generation and rights advocacy.
This can be seen as a sign of the failure of centralised
Arab states to bring about social change and
development. Such NGOs are widely viewed as the
development of an Arab “civil society”, which can
contain the authoritarian state, and as a healthy
sign of real, “bottom-up” democracy in the region.
On the other hand, they have also been viewed as
a new and growing form of dependency on the
West. Debates abound concerning the ideology of
NGOs, their links both to their own states and to
the states that fund them, and their utility for
development and social change. These debates are
given a new edge by signs that the current American
government is giving greater attention than ever
before to “democratisation” and “modernisation”
of Arab societies and Arab regimes, through
increased funding for civil society organisations.
The US administration sees the role of women as
vital in this respect.
This article traces the development of the Arab
women’s movements, with special attention to what
I call their “NGO-isation”. To shed some light on
this trend, I examine the changing structures and
discourses of Arab women’s movements, in the
context of a development discourse based in binaries
such as West/East and state/civil society. The growing
number of Arab NGOs in general, and women’s
NGOs in particular, must be seen in the context of
a broader development trend that views NGOs as
a vital vehicle for social change and democratisation.
I will argue though that the NGO as a form of
organisation is different in critical ways from another
kind of organisation aimed at social change, namely
the social movement. Analysing this difference is
useful in revealing the limitations of NGOs in
introducing genuine, comprehensive and
sustainable development, and the social changes
desired by local populations. This is not to say that
the role of NGOs should be explained in terms of
“conspiracy theory”, but rather that they should be
subjected to a more historical and empirical
approach that does not take for granted their
equivalence with “healthy” socio-political
development.
2 Arab women’s organisations in
historical context
Many discussions about the proliferation and
efficacy of Arab women’s NGOs are contextualised
in the dichotomy of West versus East. The West is
seen by fundamentalist groups as a power which
wants to impose its cultural values – especially
individual freedom, materialism and securalism –
on the world. In contrast, Arab nationalists and
leftists view the West as colonial and corrupting,
buying the loyalties of the elites, whether political,
social or economic, bringing to the foreground what
Leila Ahmed calls ‘colonial feminism’ (Ahmed 1992:
163). Others set the proliferation of NGOs in a
context of ongoing expansion of neo-liberalism,
and the formation of a “globalised elite” (Hann and
Dunn 1996; Edwards and Hulme 1992; Vivian
1994; Omvedt 1994; Petras 1997; Hanafi and Tabar
2002: 32–6), or as ‘mitigating the class conflict,
diluting class identities and culture, blurring the
class borders and blunting the class struggle within
nations and between them’ (Qassoum 2002:
44–56).
With the region experiencing increasing Western
economic and political intrusion, Arab women’s
movements emerged in the first half of the twentieth
century amid two major political projects,
independence and modernisation, stemming from
secular nationalism and Islamic modernism
respectively. While Islamic modernism aimed to
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rescue religion from narrow or erroneous
interpretations, opening up Islam as a vital force in
women’s and men’s daily lives, secular nationalism,
articulated in the wake of colonial occupation,
involved collective self-review as part of a project
of national reinvigoration to win independence
(Badran 1995; Baron 1994; Radwan 1998; Lazreg
1994). 
Women were seen by the secular nationalists as
an integral part of the “new nation”; and women
themselves saw the realisation of their social rights
as linked to future independent Arab states. In this
context, Arab women formed organisations to
enhance women’s participation in the battles for
independence, to defend their people and work to
“advance” women in the realms of education,
political participation and cultural life. Their
organisations and unions were strongly supported
by the emerging national and religious elite striving
for independence and the advancement of their
countries. The heroic role played by Algerian and
Palestinian women in the battles to liberate their
countries was one outcome of this phase in the
growth of women’s organisations.
Arab women’s movements at that time were not
isolated from the emerging international women’s
movements. Egyptian women, for example, were
closely involved in the International Women’s
Suffrage Alliance, and the Egyptian Feminist Union
(EFU) produced a journal in French, L’Egyptienne,
aimed in part at altering the national image of Egypt
abroad. Egyptian feminists also called in the
international feminist forum for attention to the
violation of the national rights of Palestinian Arabs,
as well as convening an early international
conference to support Palestinian women in their
struggle against Zionism. This conference, ‘Women
of the Orient’, attracted delegations from all over
the Arab world and abroad, as well as a large
Palestinian women’s delegation (Zu’aytir 1980).
International feminists were confronted with issues
of imperialism that they may have preferred to
ignore (Badran 1995: 13).
In Egypt, Algeria, Palestine and many other Arab
countries, the “new woman” was deployed, and
deployed herself, against the coloniser. “Authentic”
dress and veiling did not constitute worrying issues
at this time, and were not adopted by nationalist
women as pressing strategies (Ahmed 1992; Badran
1995; Fleischmann 1999). Influenced by Arab
socialism, many newly independent nations –
Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Yemen – installed
“state feminism”, introducing economic and social
policies aimed at integrating women in the labour
market and the new nation (Kandiyoti 1991;
Molyneux 1991; Moghadam 1993; El-Kholy 1998).
Many women, especially those from poorer social
strata, benefited from social rights such as free
education, health and maternity services.
In contrast to the situation before independence,
however, the newly emerging states showed strong
hostility towards independent women’s
organisations, especially during the 1960s, which
led to their banning (Egypt, Jordan), or their co-
optation (Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Tunisia). The legacy
of “populist authoritarianism” as an elite strategy
for maintaining hegemony (Brumberg 1995: 230)
endured despite the broad-based nature of
independence struggles. 
Arab women’s experiences with their states vary
from one nation to another. In most of the Gulf
area, women’s movements are still struggling to
obtain basic political rights. In the states that claimed
to be nationalist, socialist, or progressive, women
suffered from the “Algerian syndrome”,
disappointment with state policies which did little
or nothing to change women’s status as
“dependants” on male citizens. The state in most
of these countries did little to change laws and penal
codes that did not reflect changes in the situation
and status of women, especially well-educated,
professional women from the middle and lower
middle classes. New restrictions on women’s
organisations were imposed, and women who
participated in opposition political parties were
“equally” targeted by state persecution and
punishment. This led to the destruction or
weakening of all forms of political and social
participation, including political parties, workers’,
peasants’, students’ and women’s unions. Some
feminist voices arose in this period to denounce
“Arab patriarchy” as the main obstacle to women’s
advancement.
From the mid-1970s, with most Arab states failing
to achieve a sustainable level of development, or to
absorb the increasing number of young people
seeking employment, structural adjustment policies
were widely adopted. This resulted in the almost
complete withdrawal of the state from investment
in the public sector, which led in turn to a severe
deterioration of social and economic rights, translated
in rising rates of unemployment and declining social
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welfare support from the state. In the longer term,
this deterioration had a strong impact on women’s
status, illustrated by the UNDP’s Arab Human
Development Report 2002, which showed increases
in women’s illiteracy, unemployment, poverty and
political marginalisation.
By the 1980s, when many Arab states were
shaken by economic and social crises, most leaders
successfully continued to evade domestic
challenges, making only minimal response to
demands for economic and political change. The
collapse of the “communist bloc”, traditional ally
of many Arab states, contributed further to the
retreat of progressive nationalism, at the same time
as the Iranian revolution put an end to the regime
of the Shah, bringing an Islamist religious leadership
to power. Development within the region has also
been held back by the increasingly aggressive policy
of the state of Israel and the devastating destruction
it has inflicted on countries like Lebanon and
Palestine, and the consequent effects on ethnic
separatist groups whether in Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon,
or elsewhere (Jawad 2004). Against an increasingly
bleak background of internal stagnation, external
pressure increased on Arab countries to introduce
more change, this time under the banner of a new
development policy, “good governance”, supported
by the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the USA and many European donors.
This external pressure has ratcheted up very
steeply in the wake of September 11th, with the
increasingly aggressive policy of the USA, and its
demonisation of Muslims in general and Arabs in
particular. These have had negative effects of putting
the whole region on the defensive, and forcing its
peoples to adhere even more to a decaying status
quo. The logic of “good governance” has become
particularly important in underpinning US
interventions in the region, with the military
aggression to force regime change in Iraq being
justified by a rhetoric of the need to “democratise”.
According to a recent news item, the current US
administration views the many ills in Arab society
as due to lack of democracy, and the inferior status
of Arab women. US officials have said that their
focus on democracy-building projects and the
redirection of aid money to grassroots efforts can
accomplish two things. One is to build the desire
and ability to reform authoritarian governments,
great and small. The other is to soften the image on
the Arab street of the USA as a malign power whose
only concern in the region is defending Israel, and
thus preserving its access to cheap oil. After
infrastructure and free trade, “democracy” tops the
United States Agency for International
Development’s (USAID) regional agenda.1 The
promotion of democracy and the rule of law
includes activities intended to strengthen “civil
society” and significant support to NGOs.
The USA’s professed concern with democracy
arouses the scepticism of many in the Arab world.
Mustapha Kamel Al Sayyid, director of the Center
for Developing Countries Studies at Cairo University,
argues it would not be in US interest to promote
true democracy in Egypt, since the only viable
alternative to the present government is the Islamist
opposition – a group known for its dislike of
American policy. ‘If the result of democratisation
is that Islamists gain more voice in politics, then
no doubt the US government will not, in practice,
do much in the way of the real promotion of
democracy’ (cited in Lussier 2002).
The relation of NGOs to democracy is criticised
from a number of perspectives. For example, the
proliferation of NGOs is seen by some as the
formation of a “globalised elite” in a context of
ongoing expansion of neo-liberalism (Hanafi and
Tabar 2002: 32–6), and by others as ‘mitigating
the class conflict, diluting class identities and
culture, blurring the class borders and blunting
the class struggle within nations and between them’
(Qassoum 2002: 44–56). Important for women
activists, however, is that this support by
international actors, particularly the US
government for women’s organisations, and more
generally for building up “civil society”, serves to
add yet more fuel to an already burning debate in
the Arab world on the role envisioned and played
by Arab NGOs, and women’s NGOs in particular,
in the process of development, democratisation
and social change. 
3 Development and feminism:
echoes of the colonial encounter
These debates have to be examined with care, and
take into consideration that external aid, whether
from UN agencies or foreign governments, is seen
in many Third World countries as a small portion
of what was historically stolen from them, a
continuation of the colonial encounter. The problem
therefore is not in the aid itself, but rather in the
way it is invested, to whom it is offered and how it
IDS Bulletin 35.4 Repositioning Feminisms in Development
36
can be brought under more democratic control. 
Some Arab feminists suggest that ‘what the
colonists sought was to undermine the local culture’
through ‘colonial feminism’ (Ahmed 1992). Like
Lazreg, Ahmed is disturbed by the resemblance she
perceives between colonial discourses and that of
some contemporary Western feminists. She
perceives them as devaluing local cultures and
assuming that there is only one path to the
emancipation of women, namely the path of
‘adopting Western models’ (Ahmed 1992; Lazreg
1994). On the other hand, Badran rejects such a
position, arguing that ‘attempts to discredit or to
legitimise feminism on cultural grounds … are
political projects’. For her, the origins of feminism
cannot be found in any culturally “pure” location:
‘External elements – external to class, region,
country – are appropriated and woven into the
fabric of the “indigenous” or local. Egypt, for
example, has historically appropriated and absorbed
“alien elements” into a highly vital indigenous
culture’ (Badran 1995: 31–2). She implies that
Egyptian feminism is part of such an indigenous
culture, underlining how women such as Hoda
Sharawi and Ceza Nabarawi were more nationalist
and uncompromising regarding British colonialism
than men of their class. In spite of meeting with
European feminists, and developing their ideas in
relationship to European feminist organisations,
Egyptian feminists were politically independent,
expressing criticism of European support for
Zionism. Further, their deepest concern was with
the conditions of Egyptian and Arab women. Thus
Egyptian feminists were very much part of, and
concerned with, their own societies, and cannot be
dismissed as Western (hence somehow inauthentic)
agents. 
Abu-Lughod further notes:
notions of separate cultures have themselves
been produced by the colonial encounter. This
leads to different possibilities for analysing the
politics of East and West in the debates about
women, ones that do not take the form of
narratives of cultural domination versus
resistance, cultural loyalty versus betrayal, or
cultural loss versus preservation. It also opens
up the possibility of exploring, in all their
specificities, the actual cultural dynamics of the
colonial encounter and its aftermath. (Abu-
Lughod 1998: 16)
Drawing on her empirical study of the Egyptian
women’s movements, Al-Ali concludes that:
Egyptian women activists, as varied as they might
have been in their ideological inclinations, were
active agents in their specific cultural, social and
political contexts. It never fails to astonish me
how women activists continue to be discredited
on the basis of their class affiliation and links to
European culture and education, while male
political activists, especially communists, do not
seem to be exposed to the same degree of
scrutiny concerning their class or educational
background. (Al-Ali 1998: 121)
What can be concluded is that, in order to avoid
falling into these cultural dichotomies, it is
important to study – preferably empirically – the
context in which these groups and organisations
are working, what are their strategies, their form
of organisations, their links to other social and
political groups, to the state, and to powerful
external agencies and their models of development.
Based on a number of empirical studies
conducted on women’s NGOs in Egypt, Palestine
and in other Third World countries in Africa and
Latin America, one can draw some tentative
conclusions about the contextualised nature of these
organisations. The rapid proliferation in the Arab
world of issue-oriented groups, which is one way
of defining an NGO, obliges us to ask how these
groups should put the issues underlying their
formation into a wider context; and, further, how
the struggle for these issues (mostly related to social
rights) is linked to a wider political, social and
economic context. Putting women’s issues into these
contexts is important so as to identify what other
social groups might join the struggle for change on
any specific issue. But what we are seeing so far is
that most Arab women’s NGOs do not attempt a
thorough analysis of, for example, the role of the
state in allowing specific issues to persist; nor do
they ask about its project for social change, or what
the role of a wider women’s and social constituency
should be to achieve this change.
The Latin American experience supports the
necessity for such analysis. Latin American women’s
movements have demonstrated that women’s rights
cannot be realised by pleading with an authoritarian
state, nor by isolating women in women’s
organisations. By having their own organisations,
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then enlarging their constituencies, allying with
political parties, and participating in the struggle
for democratisation and political transition, Latin
American women managed to mainstream their
demands within state and society (Alvarez 1990;
Molyneux 1996; Waylen 1996). These scholars
have shown that women’s organisations did not
follow one path or strategy in their conflict with
the state but rather a multifaceted approach that
included many options. 
An important point stressed by Waylen is that,
in order to form political power, women’s
organisations need to link poor women’s needs and
interests with middle class women’s interests. The
concept of citizenship implies some commitment
to the principle of equality, and to universal
principles, but without assuming an undifferentiated
public with identical needs and interests (Molyneux
1998: 84). The challenges of reconciling different
class interests face Arab women’s movements. The
way that these challenges are met will depend partly
on organisational structure. It is here that a
differentiated and nuanced approach to the concept
of “civil society” becomes necessary.
4 The NGO-isation of Arab
women’s movements
The formation of women’s NGOs with particular
social aims marks a very different form and structure
for Arab women’s activism from those that
predominated in earlier periods. The early years of
the twentieth century were characterised by the
spread of women’s literary salons, mainly for highly
cultured and educated upper middle class women.
Urban middle and upper class women also ran
charitable societies, and later women’s political
unions, based on open membership for women. In
Palestine for example, charitable societies recruited
hundreds of women in their administrative bodies
and general assemblies, while women’s unions had
large memberships extending to women in villages,
and after 1948 in refugee camps. If we compare
their reach with that of contemporary NGOs, one
easily notes a decline in numbers. 
The prevailing structure of NGOs, meanwhile,
is that of a board of between seven and twenty
members, and a highly qualified professional and
administrative staff whose number is generally
small, depending on the number and character of
projects being dealt with. The power of decision is
often not, as it is supposed to be, in the hands of
the board, but usually in those of the director. The
power of the latter stems from his or her ability to
fundraise, be convincing, presentable and able to
deliver the well-written reports that donors require.
In order to achieve these requirements,
communication and English language skills become
essential. In some cases, an NGO director has the
power to change board members, sometimes even
without their knowledge. The highly professional
qualities required of administrative staff for better
communications with donors may not directly affect
the links between an NGO and local constituencies,
but most of the time it does. 
Referring here to the Palestinian experience, the
qualities of cadres in what were known as “grassroots
organisations” – the women’s committees that were
branches of political formations that sustained the
first Palestinian Intifada – differed considerably
from those required in NGO staff. The success of
the cadres lay in organising and mobilising the masses,
and was based on their skills in building relations
with people. They succeeded in this because they
had a “cause” to defend, a mission to implement,
and because they had a strong belief in the political
formations to which they belonged. It was important
for the cadre to be known and trusted by people,
to have easy access to them, to care about them,
and help them when needed. The task needed daily,
tiring, time-consuming effort in networking and
organising. These cadres knew their constituency
on a personal level, and communication depended
on face-to-face human contact. 
NGOs, by contrast, depend mainly on modern
communication methods such as media, workshops
and conferences – globalised tools, rather than local
ones. These methods may not be bad in themselves
but they are mainly used to “advocate” or “educate”
a “target group”, usually defined for the period
needed to implement the “project”. Here the
constituency is not a natural social group; rather it
is abstract, receptive rather interactive, and the
“targeting” is limited by the time frame of the project.
This temporality of the project and the constituency
makes it difficult to measure the impact of the
intervention.
In this respect, the “targeting” policy is always
limited, and implemented by professionals hired
by the organisations to do the “job”. This
differentiates it from a ‘mission’ based on conviction
and voluntarism. In addition, NGOs do not set
organisation or mobilisation as goals. These
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differences between the structures and aims of
NGOs and grassroots organisations do not help
NGOs to act as mobilising or organising structures.
As for the internal governance of NGOs, a study
of more than 60 Palestinian NGOs found that beside
the marginal role played by their boards, most of
their employees do not participate in the decision-
making due to ‘their passivity or their lack of
competence’ (Shalabi 2001: 152). The “target”
groups do not participate in decision-making or
drawing up policy either. In many women’s NGOs,
the staff had nothing to do with the general budget
of their organisation, and do not know how it is
distributed. According to Shalabi, the internal
governance of the surveyed NGOs was ‘a mirror
reflection of the Palestinian political system based
on individual decision-making, patronage and
clientelism’, and the lack of rules organising internal
relations in the organisation. In some cases a union
dispute erupted, and was settled in a ‘way very far
away from the rule of law’ (Shalabi 2001: 154).
It is important to notice these differences to help
clarify the prevailing confusion between social
movements and NGOs. In order to have weight or,
in political terms, power, a social movement has to
be based in large numbers. According to Tarrow,
what constitutes social movements is that ‘at their
base are the social networks and cultural symbols
through which social relations are organised. The
denser the former and the more familiar the latter,
the more likely movements are to spread and be
sustained’ (Tarrow 1998: 2). He adds that ‘contentious
collective action is the basis of social movements;
not because movements are always violent or
extreme, but because it is the main, and often the
only recourse that most people possess against better-
equipped opponents’ (Tarrow 1998: 2). 
The same can be said of women’s movements.
To put “women’s movement” into context, we have
to ask first, what a “women’s movement” is and how
can we distinguish it from “women in movement”
(Rowbotham 1992 quoted in Jackson and Pearson
1998). To start with, there are contrasting views as
to what a women’s movement is. One kind of
movement is that which mobilises to demand
women’s suffrage, has a leadership, a membership,
and diffuse forms of political activity, as distinct
from other forms of solidarity such as those based
on networks, clubs or groups. According to
Molyneux, a movement also implies a social or
political phenomenon of some significance, due
both to its numerical size, and to its capacity to
effect change in some way or another, whether in
the legal, cultural, social or political domains. A
women’s movement does not have to have a single
organisational expression and may be characterised
by a diversity of interests, forms of expression, and
spatial location. In addition, it is made up of a
substantial majority of women, when not exclusively
made up of women (Molyneux 1998: 223).
Thus, it seems preferable to reserve the term
“movement” for something larger and more effective
than small-scale associations. Yet it is important to
note that a large number of small associations, even
with very diverse agendas, can in cumulative terms
come to constitute a women’s movement. In that
case, it has no central coordinating body nor agreed
agenda, although there will be common goals. 
The long citations presented here are intended
to shed light on the main elements that must be
present in a movement if it is to achieve change. As
I argued earlier, the typical structure of NGOs debars
them from serving as mobilising or organising
agents, so that however much they proliferate they
cannot sustain and expand a constituency, or tackle
issues related to social, political or economic rights
on a macro or national level. Were they to undertake
these aims, they would have to stop being NGOs. 
NGO reliance on the use of media
communication for advocating national issues (e.g.
fraud in election, corruption) can lead to difficulties,
pointing to the weakening effect of lack of a broad
constituency. The cases of Sa’ad el-Dine Ibrahim,
a seasoned defender of Egyptian “civil society”, and
of Eyad Sarraj, a prominent defender of Palestinian
human rights, both jailed by their governments,
need to be analysed for the light they shed on the
efficacy of NGO as opposed to “movement” action.
Big “issues” such as those they raised need an
organised constituency to carry them, otherwise
their actions are likely to be seen as stepping over
a “red line”, and drawing authoritarian punishment.
It is not easy, and perhaps not feasible, to
assemble a number of women’s NGOs to work
towards a common goal – the minimum
requirement for the definition of “women in
movement”. It appears that the NGO structure
creates actors with parallel powers based on their
recognition at the international level, and easy access
to important national and international figures. But
this international recognition is not translated into
recognition or legitimacy on the local and national
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levels. This creates a competitiveness between NGO
directors that makes it hard to compromise or agree
on common goals, since the one who compromises
may be seen as the weaker among power equals.
Coordination is more possible between NGOs with
similar aims, but it is difficult to achieve with
women’s organisations as different as charitable
societies and grassroots organisations. NGO leaders,
empowered by high levels of education, professional
qualifications, and the international development
“lingo”, have a tendency to patronise the others.
These observations are supported by NGO
studies in other Third World countries, where
proponents of a “bottom-up” approach argue that
the organisation of popular pressure and
participation from below is a necessary prerequisite
for political change and economic progress. They
are also extremely sceptical about the ability and
willingness of any regime to truly reform itself.
Under such conditions, the “top-down” approach
may simply be ineffective, as official donors have
to work mainly through the governments of
recipient countries. However, under such
conditions, the “bottom-up” approach is also likely
to fail, though for different reasons. 
The potential of NGOs to foster participatory
developments beyond the grassroots level is fairly
small, given the transitory nature of projects. The
activities of NGOs are typically project-focused;
coordination between NGOs pursuing different
aims is weak; and the potential to create change
beyond narrowly defined target groups is uncertain
at best. In any case, empowering the powerless from
below is a time-consuming process. Most
importantly, though, it is naive to assume that
participatory development at the grassroots level
can be significantly promoted in developing
countries whose governments are notoriously
unwilling to reform the political and economic
systems. If governments are not reform-minded,
they will suppress participatory developments
wherever they emerge as soon as such developments
threaten to undermine the power base of the ruling
elites. The experience of NGOs in various countries
offers ample evidence to this effect. The “bottom-
up” approach obviously relies on supportive
measures by government authorities (Nunnenkamp
1995: 14–15). 
One should raise here the question: are Arab
governments willing to introduce reforms? Do they
act to reform themselves? The evidence from Iraq,
Egypt, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and other Arab
countries suggest that they are not, and do not. The
appearance of the wives of presidents and rulers,
princesses, and prominent women in certain
women’s NGOs cannot be translated as a willingness
to reform, but means rather that women’s rights
and claims are seen as apolitical and politically
unthreatening, since they do not touch the political,
economical and social foundations of the Arab
regimes.
In this article, I have argued that the role
attributed by UN agencies and international
development organisations to Arab women’s NGOs
as a vehicle for democratisation and participatory-
based development needs to be re-assessed through
empirical studies, and not pursued on the basis of
the old dichotomies of West versus East. The Arab
women’s NGOs in their actual forms and structures
might be able to play a role in advocating Arab
women’s rights in the international arena, provide
services for certain needy groups, propose new
policies and visions, generate and disseminate
information. But, in order to affect a comprehensive,
sustainable development and democratisation, a
different form of organisation is needed with a
different, locally grounded vision and a more
sustainable power basis for social change.
IDS Bulletin 35.4 Repositioning Feminisms in Development
40
Note
1. Washington Post, 4 November 2002. 
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